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NOTES
OWNERSHIP OF NAVIGABLE WATERBOTTOMSCALIFORNIA CO. V. PRICE REVISTED

Gulf Oil Corporation instituted a concursus proceeding to
distribute accrued mineral royalties to the rightful owner of
navigable waterbottoms leased to the company by both the
state and private landowners. Relying upon California Co. v.
Price,1 the private litigants asserted that their title under a
patent issued by Louisiana in 1911 had been rendered unassailable by Act 62 of 19122 requiring that suits to vacate or
annul state patents be brought within six years; the state
contended that the patent was absolutely null because the
ownership of all lands beneath navigable waters in Louisiana
rests in the state. Overruling its prior decision in Price, the
Louisiana Supreme Court held that patents purporting to
convey the beds of navigable waterways in Louisiana for private ownership are ineffective and that Act 62 does not ratify
such transfers. Gulf Oil Corp. v. State Mineral Board, 317 So.
2d 576 (La. 1975).
The Louisiana Civil Code classifies navigable waterbottoms as public things and evinces a legislative desire to place
such lands beyond the reach of private ownership. 3 The longstanding civilian tradition of insusceptibility of private ownership of navigable waterbottoms 4 was reinforced in 1812
1. 225 La. 706, 74 So. 2d 1 (1954).
2. La. Acts 1912, No. 62: "Section 1. Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Louisiana .... That all suits or proceedings of the State of
Louisiana, private corporations, partnerships or persons to vacate and annul
any patent issued by the State of Louisiana, duly signed by the Governor of
the State and the Register of the State Land Office, and of record in the State
Land Office, or any transfer of property by any subdivision of the State, shall
be brought only within six years of the issuance of the patent, provided, that
suits to annul patents previously issued shall be brought within six years
from the passage of this Act. Section 2. Be it further enacted, . . • That all
laws or parts of laws in conflict herewith be and the same are hereby repealed."
3. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 449-50, 453 and 482, when construed together,
demonstrate a system of classification designed to separate property capable
of being owned by individuals from property owned by the state, i.e., public
things, or owned by no one, i.e., common things. Subsequent legislative action
has reduced the scope of common things to air, making all navigable waters
public things. See LA. R.S. 9:1011 (Supp. 1954); LA. R.S. 49:3 (1950); LA. R.S.
56:421 (1950).
4. This tradition dates back to Roman times. See 2 C. AUBRY & C. RAU,
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upon Louisiana's admission to the Union, when the state's
dominion 5 over all navigable waters and the lands beneath
them was reaffirmed by the common law notion of inherent
sovereignty. 6 Prior to the American Revolution, title to
navigable waterbottoms was vested in the English Crown 7 or
any entities granted such submerged lands by the Crown;8
after the Revolution the people became the sovereign, and
title to navigable waterbottoms vested in the states for public
use.9 All states admitted after adoption of the Constitution
DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS §§ 168-71 (7th ed. Esmein 1961) in J. MAYDA, 2 CIVIL
LAW TRANSLATIONS 45-61 (1966); W. BUCKLAND, A TEXTBOOK OF ROMAN
LAW 182-86 (3d ed. 1963); 1 M. PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE pt. 2, nos.
2173-90 at 281-90 (11th ed. La. St. L. Inst. transl. 1959); 1 A. YIANNOPOULOS,
PROPERTY §§ 11-22 in 2 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 26-63 (1966); Yiannopoulos, Introductionto the Law of Things: Louisiana and ComparativeLaw,
22 LA. L. REV. 756, 763-65 (1962).
5. Under principles of international law, lands can be acquired by conquest, discovery and claim or some variety of cession. Martin v. Waddell, 41
U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 408-16 (1842). R. SWIFT, INTERNATIONAL LAW, CURRENT &
CLASSIC 120-200 (1969). A government acquiring such lands could, depending
upon the method of acquisition, acquire both imperium (control or sovereignty) and dominium (ownership). The King of England had both dominium and imperium over the colonies via the right of discovery and claim,
and upon achieving independence, the thirteen original states claimed all the
rights that belonged to the Crown as inherent to state sovereignty, and
reserved dominium over the beds of inland navigable waters. Shively v.
Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1894).
While a custodian of federal territorial lands, Congress adopted the policy
of reserving title to the beds of navigable waters, United States v. Holt State
Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 55 (1926), on the theory that the United States was the
trustee for the citizens of the states to be formed from the territorial lands.
Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 48-50 (1894); Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.)
212, 221-22 (1844).
6. See Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313 (1973); Shively v.
Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894); Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892);
Rundle v. Delaware & Raritan Canal Co., 55 U.S. (14 How.) 80 (1852); Martin
v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842); 1 A. YIANNOPOULOS, PROPERTY § 32 in
2 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 90-96 (1966).
7. From an historical viewpoint, the interests of the public in navigation,
fishing and commerce have been sought to be preserved, and limitations were
placed upon the sovereign's ability to grant property used for such purposes
to private owners. What has created a great deal of confusion is the question
of the public's ability to assert rights in unique public lands against their
own government. R. HALL, ESSAY ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CROWN AND THE
PRIVILEGES OF THE SUBJECT IN THE SEA SHORES OF THE REALM (3d ed.
Moore 1888). See also Fraser, Title to the Soil under Public Waters-A Question of Fact, 2 MINN. L. REV. 313, 429 (1918).
8. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894).
9. English notions of sovereignty were tied to the concept of tidal activ-
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were admitted on an equal footing ° with the original thirteen
states and enjoy the same rights of sovereignty.
By 1850, Louisiana had reacquired waste lands it ceded to
the federal government as a condition of statehood, and an
act of the legislature in 1855 again affirmed the state's desire
to retain title to navigable waters and their beds by restricting the sale of shallow lakes under the act to those not navigable.'1 Act 124 of 1862 altered the classification of lakes
navigable in 1812 but non-navigable in 1862 to that of "swamp
lands" and allowed their private alienation, thus again impliedly retaining the policy of non-alienation of navigable
waters and their bottoms. The legislature's continued disapproval of alienation of lands beneath navigable waters was
demonstrated in a series of acts designed to foster the com12
mercial development of the oyster industry in the state,
whereby the state would retain title to all navigable bodies of
water primarily along the Gulf. Throughout the time of passage of the Oyster Statutes, judicial decisions' 3 with respect
ity. Bottoms subject to the ebb and flow of the tides were subject to the
dominion of the Crown. In America, because of the numerous water areas
unrelated to tidal waters, the broader concept of navigability was adopted as
the controlling criterion. See Fraser, Title to the Soil under Public Waters-A
Question of Fact, 2 MINN. L. REV. 313 (1918); Comment, The Federal Common
Law of Accretion: A New Element in PropertyLaw, 35 LA. L. REV. 178 (1974).
10. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894); Manchester v. Massachusetts,
139 U.S. 240 (1894); Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845); 2 Stat. 641
(Feb. 20, 1811) (equal footing for Louisiana).
11. La. Acts 1855, No. 247.
12. La. Acts 1932, No. 67; La. Acts 1924, No. 139; La. Acts 1914, No. 54;
La. Acts 1910, No. 189; La. Acts 1904, No. 52; La. Acts 1902, No. 153; La. Acts
1896, No. 121; La. Acts 1892, No. 110 and La. Acts 1886, No. 106 comprise
the Oyster Statutes. Sections 1 and 2 of each act, subsequent to the initial
act, generally repeated the provisions of the immediately preceding act, and
all the acts recognize the state's ownership of all waterbottoms along the
Gulf coast. An additional statute, La. Acts 1910, No. 258, extends state ownership to all inland waterbottoms not previously owned.
13. State ex rel. Board of Comm'rs v. Capdeville, 146 La. 94, 83 So. 421
(1919) (no navigable waterbottoms ever came under the jurisdiction of Congress so none could have been transferred back to the state by Congress);
State v. Richardson, 140 La. 329, 72 So. 984 (1916) (by virtue of inherent
sovereignty navigable waterbottoms are owned by the state); State v. Bayou
Johnson Oyster Co., 130 La. 604, 58 So. 405 (1912) (authority of a levee district
can extend only to non-navigable waterbottoms because of the state's inherent sovereignty claim to navigable waterbottoms); Louisiana Navigation Co.
v. Oyster Comm'n, 125 La. 740, 51 So. 706 (1910) (patent grants of lands along
the sea carry title only to the high water mark, since Louisiana does not
allow private ownership of the bed of a navigable stream); Milne v. Girodeau,
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to the ownership of navigable waterbottoms indicated that,
under the Louisiana Civil Code, private persons could not own
14
such lands.
Act 62 of 1912 limited the period for bringing "all suits to
vacate or annul" any patents, issued previously or subsequently, to six years after the date of the patent or of the act,
whichever occurred later.'5 The act seemed to grant validity
to all patents not contested within six years, but in light of
over 100 years of legislative and judicial pronouncements
against private ownership of navigable waterbottoms, the
question necessarily arose whether the legislature intended
to abrogate past laws regarding ownership of the lands beneath navigable state waters by way of a statute of repose.
For over 40 years the Louisiana Supreme Court had few
opportunities to examine the question,' 6 but in the 1954 case
of California Co. v. Price,17 a majority of the court held that
Act 62 was meant to apply to all patents, the aim of the
legislation being stability of title even in void patents. De5
a 1954
spite vigorous and well-reasoned dissents in Price,'
12 La. 324 (1838) (land beneath the high water mark of Lake Ponchartrain
insusceptible of private ownership).
14. La. Const. art. IV, § 2 (1921), expressly prohibited alienation of
navigable waterbottoms. Thus any inquiry into the validity of waterbottom
transfers must be viewed as addressed to circumstances existing prior to
1921. LA. CONST. art. IX, § 3 authorizes alienation of a navigable waterbottom by the state but only for the purpose of reclaiming such lands lost by
erosion.
15. This six year prescriptive period was modeled after an 1891 federal
statute, now 43 U.S.C. § 1166. Several federal cases interpreting the federal
statute are listed at note 28, infra.
16. The question of applicability of Act 62 to navigable waterbottom
patents as opposed to non-navigable waterbottom patents or dry land patents had arisen only four times prior to the Price case. Humble Oil & Refining
Co. v. State Mineral Bd., 223 La. 47, 64 So. 2d 839 (1953); O'Brien v. State
Mineral Bd., 209 La. 266, 24 So. 2d 470 (1945); Realty Operators, Inc. v. State
Mineral Bd., 202 La. 398, 12 So. 2d 198 (1942); State v. Sweet Lake Land & Oil
Co., 164 La. 240, 113 So. 833 (1927).
17. 225 La. 706, 74 So. 2d 1 (1954).
18. All the dissenting opinions in Price viewed the decision as doing
violence to the fundamental principles of Louisiana property law shown in
code articles and prior jurisprudence, as well as to principles of reasonable
statutory construction. In addition, Justice Hawthorne's dissent analyzed
the cases cited at note 16, supra, to show that Sweet Lake dealt with a
non-navigable body of water, Realty did not deal with the issue of navigability, navigability was not determined in O'Brien, and the Humble Oil case
relied upon the prior decisions. 225 La. 706, 752, 74 So. 2d 1, 17 (1954).
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legislative act designed to interpret restrictively the imputed
intent of the legislature of 1912,19 and much criticism from
doctrinal writers throughout the state, 20 the supreme court
nevertheless refused to apply the 1954 "interpretative" stat21
ute and denied writs in the 1961 case of State v. Cenac,
which involved the same issue as Price.
The objections to the Price decision continued, 22 but not
until the instant case did the Louisiana Supreme Court have
another opportunity to confront the issue of Act 62's effect
upon patents conveying navigable waterbottoms. 23 Writing
for the majority, Justice Barham examined code provisions,
legislative and judicial authorities, and the public policy they
evidence to determine that state officials who issued patents
encompassing navigable waters were without power to do so. If
no power existed to transfer the beds, the patents would have
been absolutely null and void were it not for Act 62 of 1912;
hence the main question was whether Act 62 was intended to
ratify absolutely null patents. Applying the rule of statutory
construction that prescription is stricti juris,24 the majority
19. The Louisiana legislature enacted La. Acts 1954, No. 727 just eleven
days after the Price decision. See LA. R.S. 9:1107-09 (Supp. 1954). The Act
declared that the legislature in 1912 intended to confirm only patents of lands
susceptible of private ownership. See Carter v. Moore, 258 La. 921, 934, 248
So. 2d 813, 817 (1971) (concurring opinion).
20. See, e.g., The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1958-1954
Term-Property, 15 LA. L. REV. 273, 275 (1955); Hebert & Lazarus, Survey of
the 1954 Louisiana Legislation-LegislationAffecting the Civil Code, 15 LA. L.
REV. 9, 21-25 (1955).
21. 132 So. 2d 897 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 241 La. 1055, 132
So. 2d 928 (1961).
22. Subsequent cases in this area have indicated a general dissatisfaction with the Price decision and the lower courts have narrowed the application of Act 62. See Stevens v. State Mineral Bd., 221 So. 2d 645 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1969) (patent void in view of oyster statute, La. Acts 1910, No. 189 and
La. Acts 1910, No. 258), annulled on other grounds, 255 La. 857, 233 So. 2d 542
(1970); Coastal State Gas Producing Co. v. State Mineral Bd., 199 So. 2d 554
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1967) (patent not properly signed and not issued by a
subdivision of the state, but by the state itself, and therefore in technical
violation of the statute); State v. Scott, 185 So. 2d 877 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 249 La. 485, 187 So. 2d 451 (1966). See also Yiannopoulos, Validity
of Patents Conveying Navigable Waterbottoms-Act 62 of 1912, Price, Carter
and All That, 32 LA. L. REV. 1 (1971).
23. Indirect confrontation occurred in Carter v. Moore, 258 La. 921, 248
So. 2d 813 (1971), in which the court held that state officials need not void a
corrective patent in order to reinstate an original patent to a navigable
waterbottom.
24. State v. Stewart Bros. Cotton Co., 193 La. 16, 190 So. 317 (1939);
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reasoned that the prescriptive statute, by its very nature,
demanded a narrow reading.25 Certainly a literal reading of
Act 62 did cover all patents, but this reading could not be
aligned with the prior legislation. To the majority, the narrow
and more reasonable interpretation was that the legislature
never intended to ratify absolutely null transfers of property
but only to grant stability of title to formally defective patents of lands that were initially suscej~tible of ownership.
Because the statute was susceptible of more than one construction, the court felt justified in construing the broad provision in pari materia with the public policy of the state as
evidenced by legislation and jurisprudence before and after
the passage of Act 62.
The majority did not favor a construction of the act that
impliedly would repeal prior laws prohibiting private ownership of navigable waterbottoms; accordingly the court found
that Act 62 and other legislative statements could be construed together 26 if Act 62 were considered inapplicable to
navigable waterbottoms. The court noted that the federal
statute 27 upon which Act 62 was based had been construed to
apply only to transfers of lands that were already alienable
public lands. 2s Another factor the majority considered in determining the purpose of the act was an evaluation of the
state's interest in navigable waterbottoms transferred to the
Garland v. Estate of Scott, 15 La. Ann. 143 (1860). "Prescription is stricti juris
and prescriptive statutes cannot be extended by analogy to cases beyond the
strict letter of the law." Coastal States Gas Producing Co. v. State Mineral
Bd., 199 So. 2d 554, 557 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967); Hayes v. Levy, 81 So. 2d 172
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1955).
25. 317 So. 2d at 585. In State v. Bayou Johnson Oyster Co., the Louisiana
Supreme Court said, "It may be, and probably is, true that there is no legal
impediment in the way ,of the state's alienating such property [navigable
waterbottoms] in favor of particular individuals ... but as we have already
seen, her [Louisiana's] declared policy has always been not to do so, and any
statute or contract from which such effect were claimed would, necessarily,
be strictly construed against the grantee." 130 La. 604, 618, 58 So. 405, 410
(1912).
26. This principle is discussed in 2A J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CON-

§§ 56.01-.05 (4th ed. 1973).
27. 43 U.S.C. § 1166 (1891).
28. See La Roque v. United States, 239 U.S. 62 (1915); Northern Pacific
Ry. v. United States, 227 U.S. 355 (1913); United States v. Chandler-Dunbar
Water Power Co., 209 U.S. 447 (1908). Each of the above decisions examined
other federal laws to determine if those laws allowed transfer of the lands
before applying the federal prescriptive statute.
STRUCTION
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state through Louisiana's entrance to the Union 29 and the
state's position of holding the land in trust for its citizens.
This "public trust" 30 theory, that only the citizens may divest
themselves of their collective right in navigable waterways,
would invalidate even legislative enactments expressly permitting the alienation of navigable waterbottoms; however,
the court chose to limit the public trust idea to a requirement
that any alienation of these lands by the legislature be express and specific. Finally, while not actually finding the 1954
act to be truly interpretative, 31 the court found it persuasive
additional evidence, in view of the special circumstances of
Price,32 and the prompt legislative action, 3 3 that the legislature never intended to allow the private ownership of navigable waterbottoms by passing a law of prescription.
It is clear from the Louisiana legislation and jurisprudence that no authority existed for the sale of or subsequent
issuance of a patent to the navigable waterbottoms in question, and any validity the patent might have had to be based
upon Act 62. Although the statute of repose on its face did
encompass all patents, an inquiry into legislative intent was
proper because a literal reading of the statute extended its
effects to lands long considered inalienable. Moreover, the
majority opinion that Act 62 was aimed only at lands initially
susceptible of private alienation seems a reasonable construction of legislative intent.
With the reversal of California Co. v. Price, uniformity
finally has been achieved in the Louisiana law of waterbottom ownership. 34 Although the dissent considered California
29. The equal footing doctrine has been partially examined in the text at
notes 7-10, supra. See also Weber v. Board of Harbor Comm'rs, 85 U.S. (18
Wall.) 57 (1873); State ex rel. Board of Comm'rs v. Capdeville, 146 La. 94, 83
So. 421 (1919).
30. 317 So. 2d 567, 589 (La. 1975).
31. The French view of interpretative legislation is that such laws are
valid clarifications of legislative intent. 1 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE
pt. 1, no. 155 at 120 (11th ed. La. St. L. Inst. transl. 1959).
32. The writer of the majority opinion in the Price case actually seemed
to request an amendatory law from the legislature, and the legislature responded to the request. See California Co. v. Price, 225 La. 706, 741-42, 74 So.
2d 1, 13 (1954).
33. See explanation in note 19, supra.
34. Today all navigable bodies of water in the state belong to the state,
whether by operation of the principles of inherent sovereignty and inextricable dominion considerations, or by virtue of LA. CIv. CODE arts. 509 and 510
as applied in Miami Corp. v. State, 186 La. 784, 173 So. 315 (1936), cert. denied,
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Co. v. Price part of an "unbroken line of jurisprudence,"3 5
creating a rule of property that had achieved the dignity of
jurisprudence constante, 36 Justice Summers' analysis of that
line of cases does not withstand close examination. To obtain
the status of jurisprudence constante, a series of adjudicated
cases must be all in accord, and the cases cited by the dissent 37 were not in accord regarding the applicability of Act 62
to navigable waterbottoms. The first cases did not even deal
with navigable waters and the later cases were based on
broad dicta in the first.3 8 Moreover, the Price decision has
been narrowly applied by the lower courts 39 and has been
thoroughly criticized by members of the Louisiana Supreme
Court, 40 doctrinal writers 41 and even the legislature. 42 Under
these circumstances the decision could hardly have become
43
customary law.
Of special interest in the instant case is the initial
emergence of a judicial statement of the public trust doctrine
in Louisiana. According to one writer," cited favorably by the
majority, Louisiana holds navigable waterbottoms in trust
for the people, and this trust may be dissolved only by means
302 U.S. 700 (1937). Non-navigable bodies of water belong ratably to the
riparian landowners with the exception of navigable waters turned nonnavigable which still belong to the state. State v. Aucoin, 206 La. 787, 20 So.
2d 136 (1944). The continued maintenance of the Aucoin exception is questionable, especially when a riparian landowner is denied continued access to
water. Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313 (1973).
35. 317 So. 2d at 602.
36. See generally Dagget, Dainow, Hebert & McMahon, A Reappraisal
Appraised: A Brieffor the Civil Law of Louisiana, 12 TUL. L. REV. 12 (1937);
Tte, The Code, Custom and the Courts: Notes Toward a Louisiana Theory of
Precedent, 48 TUL. L. REV. 1 (1973); Tucker, The Code and the Common Law in
Louisiana, 29 TUL. L. REV. 739 (1955).
37. See cases discussed in notes 16 & 18, supra.
38. See Justice Hawthorne's dissent cited in note 18, supra.
39. See cases in note 22, supra.
40. See criticisms at note 18, supra, and the concurring opinions of Justices Tate and Barham in Carterv. Moore, 258 La. 921, 923, 933, 248 So. 2d 813,
817, 827 (1971).
41. See note 20, supra. E.g., Yiannopoulos, Validity of Patents Conveying
Navigable Waterbottoms-Act 62 of 1912, Price, Carterand All That, 32 LA. L.
REV. 1 (1971).
42. See note 19, supra.
43. See H. WILKINSON & T. CAFFERY, LEASE ADMINISTRATION FROM THE
LESSOR'S STANDPOINT 37, 47-50 (Inst. Min. L. 1972) for a skeptical analysis of
the viability of the Price decision, even prior to the instant case.
44. J. MADDEN, FEDERAL AND STATE LANDS IN LOUISIANA 334-35 (1973).
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of a constitutional amendment; no legislative enactment
would be sufficient to divest the state of title to navigable
waterbottoms. This view seems far stronger than other
statements of the doctrine 45 and may be too severe to serve as
a practical guide for the future. The requirement of a constitutional amendment as a condition precedent to alienation
of natural resources by the state government would inhibit
the state's ability to act for the public good and in effect
seems to recognize a public interest in property distinct from
the state's interest as representative of the people. A better
view of the public trust doctrine is that the state is committed
only to maintain the public use of property held in trust, and
an inquiry into the validity of state transfers, therefore, centers on whether the transfers permit continued use of a property by the public and retention of state regulatory power
over that use. 46 From this view, Act 62, if intended to apply to
navigable waterbottoms, could be seen as a prohibited abdication of the state's general control over navigable waterbottoms since the statute made no provision for continued public
use. If applied in the future, the public trust doctrine may
serve as an effective weapon in preserving ecologically impor47
tant areas in Louisiana.
Although the court's decision in the instant case appears
45. Leighty, The Source & Scope of Public and Private Rights in Navigable Waters, 5 LAND & WATER L. REV. 391 (1970); Sax, The Public Trust
Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH.
L. REV. 471 (1970); Comment, Conveyances of Sovereign Lands Under the
Public Trust Doctrine: When Are They in the Public Interest?, 24 U. FLA. L.
REV. 285 (1971).
46. This view is consistent with the public trust doctrine as announced in
Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892), and in Stone, Public
Rights in Water Uses and Private Rights in Land Adjacent to Water in 1
WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS ch. 3, at 193-202 (R. Clark ed. 1967). There is no
general bar against the sale of these properties, but courts generally interpret such transfers restrictively, and the state cannot grant lands to any
private parties if the grant is such that the state effectively abdicated its
duty as trustee.
47. State court decisions extending the public trust concept beyond the
narrow area of navigable waterbottoms are: Gould v. Greylock Reservation
Comm., 350 Mass. 410, 215 N.E.2d 114 (1966) (citizens as beneficiaries of the
trust succeeded in halting the lease of parklands); Parks v. Simpson, 242
Miss. 894, 137 So. 2d 136 (1962) (ecology interests successfully claimed oyster
shell deposits in tidal waters as a part of the public trust and inalienable in
the absence of an express provision to sell); Hillebrand v. Knapp, 65 S.D. 414,
274 N.W. 821 (1937) (protection afforded all waters subject to use in public
recreation).
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correct regarding the scope of Act 62,4 its application in future cases may result in harsh consequences. In Louisiana
property law a good faith possessor usually is entitled to
retain fruits born and reborn of the soil, but must return
products such as oil to the true owner; 49 good faith possession
continues until notification is given the possessor of the defects of his title. 50 In the present decision the court found that
the private litigants had possessed in good faith until sued
and, on a one-time basis, 5 1 treated the mineral royalties received by them as fruits that need not be returned. In the
future, however, good faith possessors of-navigable waterbottoms might well be required to restore all products taken, in
accordance with the normal rules of the Civil Code. Even if
the court extends the "equitable" treatment of royalties as
fruits to later cases, the instant decision may constitute the
notice needed to place good faith possessors in bad faith,
thereby terminating any right to retain fruits. Although the
mineral lessee in the instant case protected itself by taking
leases from both the state and private landowners, other oil
companies may be in the unfortunate position of having made
large expenditures to bring in producing wells on property for
which they no longer hold valid leases. If such a situation
should arise in a later case, the state hopefully will follow the
example set in State v. Placid Oil Co. 52 by adopting and
ratifying the already existing leases.
48. The argument has been advanced that the time for answering questions of ownership of navigable waterbottoms and mineral royalties in favor
of the state has passed and that considerations of stability of title should
prevail over state ownership contentions. F. ELLIS, ANOTHER LOOK AT LOUISIANA WATERBOTTOM PROBLEMS 113, 118 (Inst. on Min. L. 1972). But see text
at notes 26-33, supra.
49. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 501-03 and 3453, when construed together, indicate that a good faith possessor is entitled to the fruits produced by the
things possessed and that timber, materials, and royalties are not fruits but
are products. Harang v. Bowie Lumber Co., 145 La. 96, 81 So. 769 (1919); Elder
v. Ellerbe, 135 La. 990, 66 So. 337 (1914).
50. The good faith possessor holds land "under a title translative of
property and not defective on its face." Vance v. Sentell, 178 La. 749, 758, 152
So. 513, 516 (1934). Good faith possession continues until the defects of the
possessor's title have been made known to him. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3453-54;
Woodcock v. Baldwin, 110 La. 270, 34 So. 440 (1902).
51. The majority accorded the rights of bona fide possession to the private litigants "without making an exception to a rule or stating any general
rule of law." 317 So. 2d at 592.
52. 300 So. 2d 154 (La. 1974).
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Severe consequences to good faith possessors, should the
state demand a return of the products removed from waterbottoms, could provide incentive for reversal of the instant
decision. If the court is willing to extend its fruits analogy to
others holding similar patents, that extension of equitable
relief would go far toward relieving the harsh results of a
decision that has finally corrected an aberration in Louisiana
property law. Hopefully the decision in Gulf Oil Corp. v. State
Mineral Board will not fall beneath the pressures brought by
dissenting groups. Mere changes in the composition of the
court should not be relied upon at a later time to overturn a
decision bringing harmony to the law of navigable waterbottom ownership. 53
Francis J. Crosby

PUTATIVE MARRIAGES: WHAT ARE "CIVIL EFFECTS"?
Two recent decisions by the Louisiana Supreme Court
highlight the difficulty traditionally attending determination
of the "civil effects" that flow to good faith spouses in a
putative marriage.' The difficulty arises in the courts' attempts to articulate a difference between rights and duties
that arise solely as a result of a marriage contract and are
therefore "civil effects" and rights and duties that are personal and would exist regardless of the existence of a marriage. 2 The supreme court's decisions in Cortes v. Fleming3
53. Chief Justice Fournet, after dissenting in Price, did, however, concur
in the denial of writs in Cenac, stating, "Indeed, there would be no stability of
title in this state if every time there is a change of the membership of this
court, previously adjudicated property rights are to be changed in accord
with the views of the individual members as newly composed." 241 La. at
1059, 132 So. 2d at 929. While this view has not been followed in overruling
the erroneous Price decision, hopefully the instant case will put an end to the
apparently endless controversy over Act 62 of 1912.
1. LA. CiV. CODE art. 117: "The marriage, which has been declared null,
produces nevertheless its civil effects as it relates to the parties and their
children, if it has been contracted in good faith."
2. Professor Pascal has noted that "by emphasizing 'civil effects' rather
than 'effects' in general, the articles imply that the purely personal rights and
obligations of the parties, as distinguished from the civil effects of marriage,
always cease with the declaration of nullity. . . ." R. PASCAL, LOUISIANA
FAMILY LAW COURSE 56 (1973) [hereinafter cited as PASCAL].
3. 307 So. 2d 611 (La. 1975).

